Agreements to Improve Student Aid: An Antitrust Perspective by Jones Merritt, Deborah & Merritt, Andrew Lloyd
17
Agreements to Improve Student Aid: 
An Antitrust Perspective
Deborah Jones Merritt and Andrew Lloyd Merritt
The cost of law school continues to climb: annual tuition and fees exceed 
$60,000 at several schools .1 Tuition discounts, meanwhile, are widespread. 
Just one-third of law students pay sticker price for their education; the other 
two-thirds secure a discount .2 Those discounts range from a few hundred 
dollars to more than $65,000.3 What accounts for such great variation in the 
price that students pay for a legal education—even among students who sit in 
the same classroom?
Some discounts address fi nancial need; others encourage students from 
underrepresented minority groups to enter the legal profession. Still others 
attract students with leadership abilities, multicultural awareness, military 
experience, or other valued qualities. As Professor Whitford explains in a 
companion article, however, a substantial number of discounts stem from 
the “intense competition” fostered by the U.S. News ranking method .4 That 
1. According to data collected by the American Bar Association Section of Legal Education 
and Admissions to the Bar, seven law schools set tuition and fees that exceeded $60,000 
for 2016–2017. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA 
REQUIRED DISCLOSURES, http://abarequireddisclosures.org/ (last visited June 16, 2017) 
(choose “Compilation—All Schools Data” for 2016, then open spreadsheet for “Tuition and 
Fees and Living Expenses”) [hereinafter ABA REQUIRED DISCLOSURES].
2. See id. (choose “Compilation—All Schools Data” for 2016, then open spreadsheet for 
“Grants and Scholarships (prior academic year)”) (113,907 students were enrolled in 
J.D. programs during 2015–2016, and 75,753 of them (66.5%) held a scholarship of some 
amount). Throughout this article, we use the words “discount,” “grant,” and “scholarship” 
interchangeably.
3. Id. Southern Illinois University School of Law reported that twenty-fi ve percent of its 
scholarships awarded no more than $500. At the top end of the scale, Columbia Law School 
reported forty-two scholarships covering its full tuition of $65,260.
4. William C. Whitford, Law School-Administered Financial Aid: The Good News and the Bad News, 67 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 4, 4 (2017).
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method incorporates the median LSAT and UGPA of each school’s entering 
class,5 giving schools a strong incentive to discount tuition in order to attract 
students who will maintain or enhance those medians.6
In recent years, another incentive for discounting has emerged. Declining 
student demand has forced schools to manage their budgets carefully. By 
setting a high list price for tuition, and then off ering customized discounts, 
law schools benefi t from price discrimination .7 This type of pricing is legal ,8 
but it imposes several costs on students and the educational program. Price 
discrimination shifts wealth from buyers to sellers; average tuition prices 
probably are higher than they would be in a more uniform pricing scheme.9 
Price discrimination that focuses on merit rather than need also discourages 
low-income students from fully developing their human capital .10 The opacity 
of the system, fi nally, may deter talented students from applying to law school; 
that deterrent eff ect can be particularly severe for low-income, minority, and 
female applicants.11 
5. See Robert Morse & Kenneth Hines, Methodology: 2018 Best Law Schools Rankings, U.S. NEWS: 
EDUC. (Mar. 13, 2017, 9:30 PM), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/
articles/law-schools-methodology?int=9d0608 [https://perma.cc/5MWV-XB2C]. Together, 
LSAT and UGPA medians account for 22.5% of a school’s score. Id.
6. Note that when schools use discounts to advance their position in the U.S. News rankings, they 
do not always reward applicants with the highest LSAT scores and UGPAs. An applicant 
with a score that matches (and thus maintains) the school’s median is just as valuable as one 
with a much higher score. Rankings-driven discounts thus vary from pure “merit” decisions.
7. Economists recognize tuition discounts as a form of price discrimination. See, e.g., Matt 
Gianneschi & Sarah Pingel, A Hidden Cause of Rising Tuition: Tuition Discounting in Public Colleges 
and Universities, PROGRESS EDUC. REFORM (Educ. Comm’n of the States, Denver, Colo.), Aug. 
2014, at 1, 4, https://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/01/14/07/11407.pdf [https://perma.cc/
UB6Z-PGJV] (“Tuition discounting is a form of price discrimination.”); Alexandre Belloni 
et al., Optimal Admission and Scholarship Decisions: Choosing Customized Marketing Off ers to Attract a 
Desirable Mix of Customers, 31 MARKETING SCI. 621, 622 (2012) (“[T]he postsecondary education 
industry . . . relies heavily on price discrimination and targeted marketing under the guise 
of scholarships and selective admission.”); James L. Doti, Is Higher Education Becoming 
a Commodity?, 26 J. HIGHER EDUC. POL’Y & MGMT. 363, 363 (2004) (“Private colleges and 
universities are price discriminators.”); Frederick G. Tiff any & Jeff  A. Ankrom, The Competitive 
Use of Price Discrimination by Colleges, 24 E. ECON. J. 99 (1998); Joel Waldfogel, First Degree Price 
Discrimination Goes to School, 63 J. INDUS. ECON. 569 (2015).
8. The Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2012), outlaws some price discrimination in 
selling goods, but the statute does not apply to the sale of services (including educational 
programs). Nor do the statute’s tentacles reach the one-on-one haggling found on car lots 
and in bazaars.
9. See infra Part II.A (discussing both empirical and theoretical evidence of this eff ect).
10. See infra Part II.C. “Human capital” represents the skills, learning, and other assets that 
an individual brings to the workplace. Humans invest in their capital primarily through 
education. See Claudia Goldin, Human Capital, in HANDBOOK OF CLIOMETRICS 55, 56 (Claude 
Diebolt & Michael Haupert eds., 2016).
11. See infra Part II.A.
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When tuition discounts focus on need, they increase access to legal 
education .12 Discounts designed to improve rankings or raise revenue, in 
contrast, cause signifi cant harm. Like Professor Whitford, we believe that the 
costs imposed by the latter discounts outweigh any benefi ts they confer. We 
encourage law schools to reduce their reliance on “merit-based” scholarships 
(which encompass all discounts based on factors other than fi nancial need) 
and devote more of their resources to need-based grants .13
Unlike Professor Whitford and other critics, however, we believe that law 
schools can pursue that goal collectively—without antitrust liability. Schools, 
in fact, have three avenues to seek that end. First, a little-known exemption 
to the Sherman Act allows “institutions of higher education . . . to agree . . . 
to award . . . fi nancial aid only on the basis of demonstrated fi nancial need” 
as long as the institutions admit all students “on a need-blind basis.”14 The 
same exemption allows schools “to use common principles of analysis for 
determining the need of such students for fi nancial aid.”15 A group of law 
schools could agree tomorrow to limit all of their scholarships to need-based 
12. “Need” is an amorphous concept for graduate and professional students. Many of these 
students are independent of their parents; if they did not attend graduate school, they 
would support themselves in the job market. At the same time, relatively few applicants have 
amassed signifi cant savings of their own. Almost all applicants, therefore, might be able to 
demonstrate some degree of need.
  Law schools nonetheless recognize that fi nancial resources vary among their students—
and award need-based scholarships on that basis. A student from a low-income family, for 
example, lacks the kind of fi nancial cushion available to a student from a more affl  uent 
background, even if neither set of parents pays for the student’s legal education. For 
examples of how law schools currently measure need, see Determination of Financial Need, HARV. 
L. SCH., http://hls.harvard.edu/dept/sfs/fi nancial-aid-policy-overview/determination-of-
fi nancial-need/ (last visited July 10, 2017) [https://perma.cc/D7L3-B5ER]; How Need-Based 
Aid Works, YALE L. SCH., https://law.yale.edu/admissions/cost-fi nancial-aid/how-need-based-
aid-works (last visited July 10, 2017) [https://perma.cc/UU5X-44SJ]; Financial Aid, STAN. L. 
SCH., https://law.stanford.edu/apply/tuition-fi nancial-aid/jd-fi nancial-support/ (last visited 
July 10, 2017) [https://perma.cc/SC5P-H7L8].
13. As Professor Whitford reports, grants that incorporate “merit” far outnumber those based 
purely on need. Whitford, supra note 4, at 7–8. In 2009-2010, public schools allocated twenty-
one percent of their scholarship dollars to purely need-based aid; private schools invested 
fi fteen percent that way. TASK FORCE ON FINANCING LEGAL EDUC., AM. BAR ASS’N, FINAL 
REPORT 29 (2015) [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE 2 REPORT]. More recently, a national sample 
of aid recipients reported that seventy-nine percent of their awards were merit-driven. LAW 
SCHOOL SURVEY OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT, LAW SCHOOL SCHOLARSHIP POLICIES: ENGINES 
OF INEQUITY 8 (2016), http://lssse.indiana.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/LSSSE-2016-
Annual-Report-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/HZ8R-93P4] [hereinafter LSSSE REPORT].
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1 note (2012) (codifying Improving America’s Schools Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
103-382, title V, § 568(a), 108 Stat. 4060, as amended). This provision is scheduled to expire 
on Sept. 30, 2022. The heading on the note is “Application of Antitrust Laws to Award of 
Need-Based Educational Aid.” A 2015 act, called the Need-Based Educational Aid Act of 
2015, Pub. L. No. 114-44, 129 Stat. 472, amends 15 U.S.C. § 1 note (2012).
15. Id.
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aid—and could devise guidelines for measuring that need—without violating 
the federal antitrust laws .16
Second, if law schools want to venture beyond this safe harbor, they could 
lobby Congress to modify the current exemption. Law schools, for example, 
might seek an exemption that shielded agreements to limit merit aid—without 
requiring those agreements to bar merit scholarships entirely. The current 
exemption already recognizes the policies supporting scholarship-related 
agreements; Congress might be amenable to a slight change in the language.
Finally, if these legislative options are not suffi  cient, law schools could ask 
the Department of Justice for a business review letter assessing the legality of 
a proposed agreement to limit merit-based aid. The Department’s Antitrust 
Division regularly issues those letters,17 and the arguments outlined in this 
article would support a favorable letter. A positive letter from the department 
would not immunize schools from antitrust liability, but it would signifi cantly 
reduce any risk.
Legal education’s accrediting body, the Council of the ABA Section of Legal 
Education and Admissions to the Bar, could also take steps to de-escalate the 
use of merit-based aid. The council, for example, could adopt an accreditation 
standard requiring each law school to divide scholarship dollars between 
need- and merit-based awards.18 An alternative standard might require schools 
to limit merit aid to funds drawn from endowments or donors specifying that 
purpose. If those avenues appear too risky—despite the routes we outline 
here—the council could adopt an accreditation standard requiring law schools 
to publicize more clearly the nature and amount of tuition discounts they off er 
to students; that type of informational standard would incur no antitrust risk.
In Part I of this article we briefl y trace the history of attempts to restrict 
merit-based scholarships in higher education, including the antitrust case law 
and congressional exemption that now govern those attempts. In Part II we 
explore social and economic research that demonstrates the procompetitive 
16. We do not address state antitrust laws in this Article. To the best of our knowledge, states 
have not attempted to use those laws to prosecute agreements related to scholarships in 
higher education. Cf. Memorandum from Wayne D. Collins & Vittorio E. Cottafavi to 
Robert Shireman & Matthew Reed (May 5, 2008) [hereinafter Collins & Cottafavi Memo], 
in INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS, TIME TO REEXAMINE INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION ON 
FINANCIAL AID 12 (2008) (memo from two antitrust experts noting that states are unlikely to 
challenge these restrictions because “a challenge . . . would likely be politically unpopular”). 
Id. at 29.
17. See infra Part III.C.
18. See Letter from Deborah Jones Merritt, John Deaver Drinko/Baker & Hostetler Chair in 
Law, Moritz Coll. of Law, Ohio State Univ., to the Am. Bar Ass’n Task Force on the Future 
of Legal Educ. (May 11, 2013) (proposing such a standard), https://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/taskforcecomments/201305_
deborah_merritt_comment.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/KR6P-QU9Z]. See also 
Randall T. Shepard, The Problem of Law School Discounting—How Do We Sustain Equal Opportunity in 
the Profession?, 50 IND. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (2016) (discussing this proposal); Whitford, supra note 4, 
at 13–14 (same).
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eff ects of agreements limiting merit-based scholarships. In Part III, fi nally, we 
explain how law schools could rely upon this history and research to navigate 
the three avenues noted above. We also examine ways for the council to modify 
its accreditation standards. As we show, there are several promising routes for 
reforming harmful scholarship practices.
I.  History: Scholarships and Antitrust Law
The tension between need-based and merit-based scholarships dates back 
centuries. In 1643, Ann Radcliff e endowed a scholarship at the fl edgling 
Harvard College; it was the fi rst scholarship in the American colonies .19 She 
intended the scholarship to benefi t a “poor scholer,” but also expressed her 
preference for a “ ‘kinsman’ if he be ‘pious’ and ‘well deserving.’ ”20 Our 
nation’s fi rst scholarship, therefore, combined notions of need (“poor”) with 
seventeenth-century concepts of merit (family relationship, piety, and moral 
desert). For centuries, American colleges continued to mingle these concepts.21
After World War II, colleges felt increased pressure to provide purely need-
based aid. The GI Bill had demonstrated the transformative power of higher 
education, and the public wanted to maintain access to those opportunities.22 
The appeal of merit-based scholarships, however, did not disappear. Top 
students had begun applying to multiple schools, which stimulated bidding 
wars for their enrollment.23 To end these wars and preserve resources for needy 
students, some of the most selective schools agreed to award aid solely on the 
basis of demonstrated fi nancial need. As we explain below, those agreements 
provoked antitrust scrutiny and—ultimately—partial vindication.
More recently, antitrust litigation has focused on a special type of merit-
based aid: athletic scholarships. The National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA) has long limited the size of those scholarships, and several athletes 
have challenged those restrictions. We discuss those developments, along with 
their relevance for law schools, in the fi nal section below.
A. The Overlap Groups
Starting in the 1950s, more than 100 colleges clustered into two dozen 
leagues known as “overlap groups. ”24 The colleges within each group tended 
19. RUPERT WILKINSON, AIDING STUDENTS, BUYING STUDENTS: FINANCIAL AID IN AMERICA 2 
(2005).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 9-45.
22. Id. at 115.
23. Id. at 115-16. Even before the advent of modern ranking systems, colleges competed to attract 
students with the most prestigious academic credentials. Professors like to work with highly 
credentialed students; those students can also enhance the educational environment for 
their classmates. Students with top credentials, fi nally, signal a college’s desirability to other 
applicants. This phenomenon existed long before U.S. News capitalized on it.
24. TIME TO REEXAMINE, supra note 16, at 6.
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to receive applications from common students; the word “overlap” referred to 
their overlapping applicant pools. Within several of these groups, the members 
agreed to ban merit-based scholarships and award only need-based aid. The 
groups also developed common guidelines for assessing need; this prevented 
participating colleges from awarding merit-based scholarships in the guise 
of extra need. Within at least some groups, fi nally, admissions offi  cers met 
annually to discuss the fi nancial need of each student admitted to more than 
one of the group’s colleges. For each of those “overlapping” admittees, the 
schools agreed on the student’s level of need.25 
The most prominent overlap group was the “Ivy Overlap” one, composed 
of the eight Ivy League colleges and the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT).26 Those schools, like members of some other groups, 
agreed to award scholarships solely on the basis of fi nancial need assessed by 
common guidelines. Starting in 1958, representatives of the Ivy Group met 
regularly to compare need assessments for students admitted to two or more 
of their schools. When schools diff ered by more than $500 in that assessment 
for a student, they adjusted their calculations so that students would pay 
comparable amounts to attend any school within the group.27
These meetings continued for more than thirty years. In 1989, The Washington 
Post revealed the practice and denounced the schools for maintaining a “price-
fi xing system that OPEC might envy.”28 The article prompted the Department 
of Justice to investigate all of the overlap groups for possible antitrust 
violations.29 In 1991, it decided to pursue the Ivy Overlap Group in court. The 
department fi led a civil action against all nine members of that group, alleging 
that they were violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act.30 The eight Ivy League 
schools signed a consent decree in which they denied liability but agreed to 
end the challenged agreements.31 MIT, however, decided to defend the group’s 
practices in court.
B.  The Lawsuit
The trial contest between MIT and the Department of Justice unfolded 
in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. After a ten-
day trial, Chief Judge Louis C. Bechtle ruled for the Department of Justice 
(Brown I).32 The Ivy Overlap agreement, Judge Bechtle found, “struck at the 
25. Id. at 6–7; WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 131–32.
26. WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 132; TIME TO REEXAMINE, supra note 16, at 7.
27. See United States v. Brown Univ., 805 F. Supp. 288, 292-96 (E.D. Pa. 1992) [hereinafter Brown 
I], rev’d, 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
28. WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 196.
29. Brown I, 805 F. Supp. at 289.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
31. Collins & Cottafavi Memo, supra note 16, at 24–25.
32. Brown I, 805 F. Supp. 288.
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heart of the commercial relationship” between colleges and their students.33 By 
setting aid amounts and banning merit scholarships, he decided, the colleges 
engaged in horizontal price fi xing.34 He refrained from declaring that conduct 
per se illegal “in light of the Supreme Court’s repeated counsel against 
presumptive invalidation of restraints involving professional associations,” 
but found the conduct unlawful after applying an abbreviated rule of reason 
analysis .35 The Ivy Group failed that “quick look” test because its justifi cations 
rested on “social policy aims” rather than the procompetitive goals required 
by the antitrust laws .36
MIT appealed the decision and, in September 1993, the Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit decisively reversed the district court (Brown II) .37 One 
member of the panel concluded that the award of university scholarships 
was “charity” rather than commercial activity; he would have granted 
judgment immediately for MIT.38 Indeed, he “question[ed] why the heavy 
artillery of antitrust has been wheeled into position to shoot down practices 
that so obviously advance the public interest.”39 The other two judges, who 
conveyed the majority view, also displayed considerable sympathy for MIT’s 
position. They decided that MIT had articulated at least two procompetitive 
justifi cations for the Overlap agreement, which required the district court to 
apply a “full scale rule of reason analysis.”40
The fi rst of these justifi cations stemmed from MIT’s claim that the agreement 
“enhanced the consumer appeal of an Overlap education” by “promoting 
socio-economic diversity at member institutions.”41 The Third Circuit agreed 
33. Id. at 298.
34. Id. at 301.
35. Id. at 301. The courts have developed three types of review for practices challenged as 
unlawful restraints of trade. Some agreements are per se illegal, others are evaluated under 
a rule of reason, and an intermediate group receives an abbreviated or “quick look” rule-of-
reason analysis. See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED 
HANDBOOK § 5.1a (3d ed. 2016); Collins & Cottafavi Memo, supra note 16, at 15–16 (discussing 
the three standards of review in the context of the Brown litigation).
36. Brown I, 805 F. Supp. at 305. The Supreme Court has made clear that antitrust law “focuses 
directly on [a] challenged restraint’s impact on competitive conditions.” Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l 
Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978). Litigants cannot invoke social welfare 
concerns to justify a restraint on trade; the courts accept only procompetitive justifi cations. 
See generally SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 35, § 5.3f.
37. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Brown II].
38. Id. at 683 (Weis, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 680. Judge Weis’s position almost certainly confl icts with established antitrust 
principles, which direct courts to focus exclusively on a restraint’s competitive impact. 
Broader appeals to the “public interest” cannot justify a trade restraint. See supra note 36. 
Weis’s opinion, however, refl ects the sympathetic eye that judges can bring to agreements 
designed to further educational aims.
40. Id. at 679.
41. Id.
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that “improvement in the quality of a product or service that enhances the 
public’s desire for that product or service” may count as a “procompetitive 
virtue.”42 The second procompetitive eff ect rested on the fact that “the number 
of students able to aff ord an Overlap education [was] maximized.”43 By 
“removing fi nancial obstacles for the greatest number of talented but needy 
students” and “widening student choice,” the Ivy Overlap agreement increased 
the number of students eligible for an elite college education.44 Once again, 
the court acknowledged “consumer choice [as] a traditional objective of the 
antitrust laws” that confers a “procompetitive benefi t.”45
The appellate court noted several other points that favored MIT. The 
Ivy Overlap agreement, the court observed, did not “cause any reduction 
of output.”46 The participating colleges, in other words, educated as many 
students under the agreement as they would have done in its absence. Nor 
did the agreement appear to have “an aggregate eff ect on the price of an MIT 
education.”47 The agreement shifted costs among students, but did not allow 
MIT to reap higher revenue overall. This “absence of any fi nding of adverse 
eff ects such as higher price or lower output [was] relevant” to the agreement’s 
status under the rule of reason.48 The court remanded the case for the trial 
judge to more fully assess the agreement under that rule. 
That assessment, the court noted, would include consideration of any 
“substantially less restrictive alternative” to the Ivy Overlap agreement.49 The 
rule of reason, it reminded the district court, requires a multistep inquiry. First 
the plaintiff  must show that an “agreement produced adverse, anti-competitive 
eff ects within the relevant product and geographic markets.”50 Next, the 
defendant may “show that the challenged conduct promotes a suffi  ciently 
pro-competitive objective.”51 If the defendant carries that burden, then “the 
plaintiff  must demonstrate that the restraint is not reasonably necessary to 
achieve the stated objective.”52 On remand, therefore, the court would consider 
both the procompetitive objectives urged by MIT and the availability of any 
less restrictive means identifi ed by the Department of Justice. 
42. Id. (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 114-15 (1984)).
43. Id. at 675.
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing NCAA, 468 U.S. at 102).
46. Id. at 674.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 679.
50. Id. at 668.
51. Id. at 669.
52. Id.
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The department, however, opted to end the case. Rather than petition the 
Supreme Court for certiorari or return to the district court, the government 
dismissed the lawsuit in return for a letter in which MIT agreed to abide 
by designated “Standards of Conduct. ”53 Those standards allowed MIT 
and other schools to “agree to provide only need-based fi nancial aid and to 
prohibit merit scholarships” as long as the participating schools “practice[d] 
need-blind admissions” and “provide[d] fi nancial aid suffi  cient to meet the full 
need of all [admitted] students. ”54 The department, therefore, acquiesced in 
group agreements to limit merit aid; its only victory lay in preventing colleges 
from jointly setting fi nancial need for specifi c students.
The department’s willingness to dismiss the suit in return for a letter, 
rather than require a consent decree or settlement contract, was unusual .55 
The department’s leniency may have refl ected the force of the Third Circuit’s 
support for agreements banning merit-based scholarships. Equally important, 
congressional developments had reduced the lawsuit’s importance.
C.  Congressional Action
While MIT fought for the Overlap principles in court, its Ivy League peers 
successfully lobbied Congress.56 The 1992 amendments to the Higher Education 
Act allowed institutions of higher education to “voluntarily agree . . . to award 
fi nancial aid . . . only on the basis of demonstrated fi nancial need” and to 
“discuss and voluntarily adopt defi ned principles of professional judgment for 
determining student fi nancial need.”57 To eliminate any prospect of antitrust 
liability, the section explicitly declared: “No inference of unlawful contract, 
combination, or conspiracy shall be drawn from the fact that institutions of 
higher education engage in conduct authorized by this section.”58
Congress, notably, set this exemption to expire after just two years.59 It 
also provided that the temporary exemption would not “aff ect any antitrust 
litigation pending on the date of enactment.” 60 The legislators, in other words, 
gave the Department of Justice an opportunity to seek judicial validation 
of its underlying antitrust claims. In particular, the department could have 
petitioned the Supreme Court to review the Third Circuit’s decision. Instead, 
53. Letter from MIT Lawyer Thane D. Scott to Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. Robert 
Litan (Dec. 22, 1993), http://tech.mit.edu/Bulletins/ovrlp-ts.html [https://perma.cc/
PJG3-7BBT].
54. Id.
55. See Collins & Cottafavi Memo, supra note 16, at 26.
56. See generally WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 199–200.
57. Pub. L. No. 102-325, 106 Stat. 456, section 1544(b). This provision did not limit the exemption 
to schools practicing need-blind admissions. Congress added that caveat in 1994. See infra 
note 61.
58. Id. section 1544(d).
59. Id. section 1544(e).
60. Id. section 1544(a).
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the department allowed MIT to sign a letter similar to the statutory exemption. 
The department thus joined the Third Circuit and Congress in allowing 
agreements that barred merit-based scholarships.
Congress did not allow the statutory exemption to lapse. It renewed the 
provision in 1994 ,61 and has continued to renew it since then.62 The most recent 
extension, passed in 2015, prolongs the antitrust exemption to September 
30, 2022.63 Institutions of higher education, therefore, may agree to award 
scholarships “only on the basis of demonstrated fi nancial need” and “to use 
common principles of analysis for determining the need” as long as they 
engage in “need-blind” admissions.64
D.  Use of the Congressional Exemption
Surprisingly few colleges or universities have taken advantage of Congress’s 
“overlap” exemption .65 On the contrary, a majority of undergraduate 
institutions embraced merit-based aid during the 1990s and 2000s .66 Some 
schools used that aid to balance budgets and fi ll empty seats.67 Others 
succumbed to pressures generated by newly popular ranking systems. Merit-
based aid, these schools discovered, would attract students with higher test 
scores and high school grades; those credentials, in turn, would enhance the 
school’s rank.68 
Just as the Ivy Overlap group prevailed, therefore, commitment to need-
based aid waned among colleges.69 Even elite schools backed away from 
agreements to bar all merit-based scholarships. A few dozen formed an 
association known as the “568 Presidents’ Group,” named after the statutory 
61. Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 568, 108 Stat. 3518, 4060. 
This version was the fi rst to limit the exemption’s reach to schools practicing need-blind 
admissions. Id. § 568(a). The statute, however, did not require schools to meet the fi nancial 
need of all admitted students, as MIT’s letter agreement with the Department of Justice 
provided. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
62. For a brief discussion of this history, see Collins & Cottafavi Memo, supra note 16, at 27.
63. Need-Based Educational Aid Act of 2105, Pub. L. No. 114-44, 129 Stat. 472 (2015).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1 note (2012).
65. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-963, HIGHER EDUCATION: SCHOOLS’ USE OF 
THE ANTITRUST EXEMPTION HAS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED COLLEGE AFFORDABILITY 
OR LIKELIHOOD OF STUDENT ENROLLMENT TO DATE 9–10 (2006), http://www.gao.gov/
assets/260/251608.pdf [https://perma.cc/J84W-TWS8] [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
66. WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 152–53; Amanda L. Griffi  th, Keeping Up with the Joneses: Institutional 
Changes Following the Adoption of a Merit Aid Policy, 30 ECON. EDUC. REV. 1022, 1022–23, 1025 (2011).
67. WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 164–74.
68. Griffi  th, supra note 66, at 1023–24.
69. We have not found any evidence that law schools (or other graduate programs) ever 
considered using the overlap exemption. Graduate and professional programs did not 
participate in the original overlap groups or the antitrust litigation. The exemption appears 
to have gone unnoticed among post-baccalaureate programs. 
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section creating the antitrust exemption.70 The group, however, has limited its 
work to maintaining common guidelines for its members to use when assessing 
fi nancial need.71 It does not require its members to eschew all merit-based aid; 
nor has it pursued other options allowed by the statutory exemption.72  
Some educators and policymakers have urged colleges to make more use of 
the exemption. In 2008, for example, The Institute for College Access & Success 
called for colleges to increase enrollment of low-income students by shifting 
aid from merit-based scholarships to need-based ones.73 Colleges, the institute 
noted, could avoid the problems of unilateral action by joining agreements 
shielded by the exemption.74 Similarly, a group of college presidents discussed 
both the exemption and their desire to constrain merit aid at a 2013 meeting 
sponsored by the Council of Independent College s (CIC) .75 Educators have 
also mooted the idea of expanding the current exemption to allow agreements 
to limit aid, rather than ban that aid entirely.76 
The Antitrust Division has given mixed signals about its attitude toward 
overlap-like agreements. In 2013, the president of one higher education 
association reported that he had held “a series of preliminary conversations 
in which offi  cials of the U.S. Justice Department had expressed a willingness 
to review (and potentially bless) accords in which colleges would agree to 
take common steps to reduce non-need-based aid.”77 Later the same year, 
however, the department opened an informal investigation into the CIC 
meeting at which college presidents had discussed their desire to limit merit-
70. GAO REPORT, supra note 65, at 9–10.
71. Id. at 11.
72. Id. The group maintains a website, http://www.568group.org/index.html, although the 
site has not been updated since 2016. A few of the wealthiest colleges, including Harvard 
and Yale, now award more need-based aid than the 568 guidelines allow. These colleges, 
accordingly, no longer participate in the group. See Caitlin Roman, Yale Leaves Financial Aid 
Group, YALE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 26, 2008, http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2008/09/26/
university-leaves-fi nancial-aid-group/ [https://perma.cc/L9VL-G639].
73. TIME TO REEXAMINE, supra note 16, at 6.
74. Id. at 7–11.
75. Doug Lederman, Baby Steps for Need-Based Aid, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 7, 2013), https://www.
insidehighered.com/news/2013/01/07/private-college-presidents-push-campaign-limit-use-
non-need-based-aid [https://perma.cc/2263-8GV5]. See also WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 
142–74 (reporting administrators’ desire to shift resources from merit scholarships to need-
based aid); Scott Jaschik, Angst and Hope for Liberal Arts Colleges, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 13, 
2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/07/13/meeting-discusses-challenges-
facing-liberal-arts-colleges [https://perma.cc/TN4T-HFLV] (reporting academic conference 
discussing these issues).
76. TIME TO REEXAMINE, supra note16, at 10–11; WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 191–92; Lederman, 
supra note 75.
77. Lederman, supra note 75.
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based scholarships.78 The department quickly backed off  the investigation,79 
especially after the presidents noted their First Amendment right to discuss 
proposed legislation,80 but the incident made some academic offi  cials uneasy 
about discussing problems in the fi nancial aid system.
E.  Student-Athletes and the NCAA
At the college level, athletic scholarships constitute an important set of merit 
awards. The NCAA allows schools to award scholarships based on athletic 
ability but, in order to preserve the amateur nature of college athletics, limits 
those scholarships to the “cost of attendance” at college .81 Schools, in other 
words, may not off er athletes fi nancial payments that exceed their educational 
costs. Until 2014, the scholarship cap was somewhat lower, embracing only 
“tuition and fees, room and board, and required course-related books.”82 That 
lower cap precluded schools from paying for transportation, supplies, and 
some other incidental expenses of college attendance.83
Several athletes have challenged the scholarship caps under the antitrust 
laws. A recent decision by the Ninth Circuit, O’Bannon v. NCAA, gave both sides 
a partial victory. Reviewing the NCAA’s pre-2014 rule, the court agreed with 
the athletes that the scholarship cap had a “signifi cant anticompetitive eff ect 
on the college education market.”84 The court then sided with the NCAA on 
the existence of a procompetitive justifi cation: the scholarship limit furthered 
the NCAA’s commitment to amateurism, which enhanced the leagues’ “appeal 
to consumers.”85 In the fi nal step of its analysis, however, the court concluded 
that the NCAA had not used the least restrictive means to protect amateurism; 
on the contrary, there were “reasonable alternatives” that would be “virtually 
as eff ective” as the NCAA’s challenged rule “without [imposing] signifi cantly 
increased cost.”86 The best alternative was the one that the NCAA had already 
adopted: raising the scholarship cap to cover the full cost of college attendance.
78. Kevin Kiley, A Deficit of Trust, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 18, 2013), https://www.
insidehighered.com/news/2013/06/18/justice-department-launches-investigation-merit-aid-
talks [https://perma.cc/M9HL-SZ5G].
79. David McCabe, Nugent Avoids DOJ Investigation into Aid, KENYON COLLEGIAN (Gambier, Ohio), 
Sept. 5, 2013, at 4, https://issuu.com/kenyoncollegian/docs/kenyon_collegian_09.05.13/4 
[https://perma.cc/26LA-GYPX].
80. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United 
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
81. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1054–55 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016).
82. Id. at 1054.
83. The monetary diff erence amounted to “a few thousand dollars at most schools.” Id. at 1054 
n.3.
84. Id. at 1072.
85. Id. at 1073.
86. Id. at 1074.
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Although the NCAA lost the O’Bannon contest, the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
established a key principle favoring the organization. The court enthusiastically 
endorsed the “NCAA’s commitment to amateurism” and the weight of that 
commitment in a rule-of-reason scale.87 The NCAA lost because it had already 
created a less restrictive rule that promoted the same ends; the court simply 
required it to apply that rule retroactively. The court’s overall approach bodes 
well for schools defending other types of agreements to limit scholarships. If 
schools articulate a persuasive procompetitive purpose, and there are no less 
restrictive means to attain that purpose, courts may uphold the agreements .88 
Litigation over the NCAA’s scholarship rules continues. The organization 
is settling one class action on grounds that track O’Bannon; it has agreed to 
compensate class members for the money they lost under the NCAA’s pre-2014 
scholarship rules.89 A more ambitious class action remains on the docket: That 
one challenges all restrictions on athletic scholarships, claiming that schools 
should be able to bid openly for the market value of players.90 Resolution of 
that lawsuit could aff ect the legality of other agreements to limit merit-based 
scholarships. The sports context, however, is so distinctive that it off ers only 
limited guidance to law schools contemplating restrictions on other types of 
merit aid.
87. Id. at 1073. Michael Carrier argues that the O’Bannon court “short-circuited” its rule-of-reason 
analysis by failing to conduct a full balancing test. Michael A. Carrier, How Not to Apply 
the Rule of Reason: The O’Bannon Case, 114 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 73, 73 (2015), 
http://michiganlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/114MichLRevFI73_Carrier.
pdf [https://perma.cc/TJW8-3CBY]. We read the O’Bannon opinion, however, as implicitly 
fi nding that the procompetitive eff ects of amateurism outweigh the anticompetitive eff ects 
on athletes, rather than as resting solely on analysis of least restrictive means.
88. See also Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012) (dismissing challenge to NCAA 
scholarship caps on the ground that the plaintiff s failed to properly identify a relevant 
market); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988) (NCAA rules limiting benefi ts 
awarded student-athletes are valid under the rule of reason).
  Antitrust defendants, of course, should do more than simply articulate a procompetitive 
eff ect; they should off er some credible evidence that the eff ect exists. Stephen F. Ross and 
Wayne DeSarbo persuasively critique O’Bannon on the ground that the defendants failed to 
show that payments to student-athletes actually would diminish the consumer appeal of 
college sports. Stephen F. Ross & Wayne S. DeSarbo, A Rapid Reaction to O’Bannon: The Need 
for Analytics in Applying the Sherman Act to Overly Restrictive Joint Venture Schemes, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. 
STATIM 43 (2015), https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/fi les/OBannon%20Final_0.
pdf [https://perma.cc/H6JY-EXUG]. They also off er an innovative marketing technique to 
measure any such eff ect.
89. Ralph D. Russo, Preliminary Approval Given to $208.7 Million NCAA Settlement, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 22, 
2017, 1:53 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/california/articles/2017-03-22/
preliminary-approval-given-to-2087-million-ncaa-settlement [https://perma.cc/TYW5-
KCM5]. The district judge gave preliminary approval to the settlement in March, and the 
plaintiff s’ fi rm has started notifying class members about the settlement. See NCAA Grant-In-
Aid Settlement, http://www.grantinaidsettlement.com/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2017).
90. Michael McCann, How Tentative Grant-in-Aid Class Action Settlement Aff ects NCAA, Student-Athletes, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.si.com/college-football/2017/02/04/
shawne-alston-grant-aid-class-action-lawsuit-ncaa-settlement (discussing Jenkins v. NCAA, 
fi led in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey).
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II.  Promoting Competition
The precedents discussed above show signifi cant sympathy for agreements 
restricting scholarships in higher education. The case law is limited, but courts 
have judged those agreements under the rule of reason rather than declare them 
invalid per se. The cases also make clear that an anti-competitive agreement 
will survive scrutiny if the defendant articulates procompetitive rationales for 
the compact, the plaintiff  cannot point to a less restrictive alternative, and 
the procompetitive benefi ts outweigh any anti-competitive burden.91 The 
procompetitive rationales voiced by the defendant play a key role in that 
analysis: They determine whether less restrictive alternatives are feasible, as 
well as whether the rule-of-reason balance tilts in the agreement’s favor.
With that template in mind, we explore the procompetitive rationales that 
might justify an agreement to limit merit scholarships in legal education. As 
we show, those scholarships harm the market in at least three ways: They raise 
overall prices; reduce access and diversity; and diminish investment in human 
capital. Agreements restricting those scholarships, conversely, would moderate 
prices, enhance access and diversity, and encourage students to invest more 
fully in their human capital. Each of these justifi cations is a procompetitive 
one that would justify an agreement to limit merit scholarships.
We cast our arguments in procompetitive terms, rather than social welfare 
ones, because the antitrust laws recognize only the former justifi cations.92 
Through the Sherman Act, Congress established a “national policy favoring 
competition.”93 Courts cannot deviate from that policy by deciding that, in 
certain markets, another public value trumps competition. Instead, in antitrust 
litigation, “the inquiry is confi ned to a consideration of impact on competitive 
conditions.”94 We focus our inquiry on the same issue.
A.  Increased Costs
The report of a recent ABA task force suggests that widespread tuition 
discounting “contributes to the steadily increasing price of legal education.”95 
91. See generally Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. 
1265 (explaining how courts apply these considerations).
92. See supra note 36.
93. FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 234 (2013).
94. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978). Some agreements 
promote procompetitive ends along with social welfare goals. Indeed, parties often can 
articulate the same purpose in multiple ways. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 35, § 5.3f. Courts 
do not penalize parties for pursuing social policies other than competition (unless those 
policies mask an attempt to restrict competition), but they accept only procompetitive 
purposes to defend an agreement.
95. TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUC., AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
2 (2014), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_
responsibility/report_and_recommendations_of_aba_task_force.authcheckdam.
pdf [https://perma.cc/HQ9J-DUFW]. See also Frank H. Wu, Foreword, LSSSE REPORT, supra 
31
The task force, in other words, proposed that discounting allows law schools 
to collect more revenue from students overall than they would obtain through 
uniform pricing. Economic theory and empirical research support that 
suggestion.
By setting a steep nominal tuition and then off ering individual discounts, law 
schools are able to benefi t from price discrimination.96 Each school estimates 
the maximum price that an applicant will pay to attend that school—and then 
tries to match that price with an appropriate discount.97 When calculating 
those off ers, schools have a signifi cant degree of consumer information. They 
know each applicant’s credentials, which allows them to predict the other 
schools that might have admitted the applicant and how much aid those 
schools might off er .98 Indeed, some information about competing off ers and 
scholarship awards is publicly available on the website lawschoolnumbers.
com .99 Some schools also request detailed fi nancial data from applicants, 
including information about parental income .100 This information allows 
note 13, at 5 (“Law schools could reduce the price of attendance across-the-board for the 
benefi t of students” by abandoning merit-based scholarships.).
96. See supra note 7 (citing economic literature that recognizes higher education scholarships as a 
form of price discrimination).
97. Schools, of course, also follow their own preferences in making scholarship off ers. A 
candidate with an LSAT at the school’s median might be willing to attend that school for 
free, but the school is unlikely to lower its price that far for a median student.
98. Some of those predictions rest on experience; others depend on sophisticated algorithms. 
See Belloni et al., supra note 7, at 623–31 (describing an algorithm for graduate MBA 
programs); Matthew Quirk, The Best Class Money Can Buy, ATLANTIC, Nov. 2005 (describing 
both experiential and mathematical models) https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2005/11/the-best-class-money-can-buy/304307/ [https://perma.cc/P8DN-ZRL6]; 
Jeff rey A. Summers, Net Tuition Revenue Generation at Private Liberal Arts Colleges, 12 EDUC. ECON. 
219, 227–28 (2014).
99. Prospective law students founded this site as a way of sharing information about the 
application process. About Us, LAW SCHOOL NUMBERS, http://lawschoolnumbers.com/about 
(last visited July 9, 2017). Applicants post their academic credentials, schools to which they 
have applied, admission status at those schools, and the size of any scholarship awards. 
Participation may skew toward applicants with large scholarship off ers, and there is no 
guarantee that applicants report their status accurately, but the data provide admissions 
offi  cers (and any other interested person) an overview of admission standards and pending 
scholarship off ers at competing schools.
100. Duke Law School, for example, counsels applicants: “Except for those students who have 
signifi cant personal and/or family resources, all candidates are urged to complete [a fi nancial 
disclosure profi le] so that they can be considered for the full range of available need- and 
merit-based scholarships.” Applying for Scholarships, DUKE LAW, https://law.duke.edu/admis/
fi nancial/handbook/sec2/#a [https://perma.cc/E56K-ZXNB]. “Parental information is 
required” for that profi le “regardless of age or marital status.” Applying for Financial Aid, DUKE 
LAW, https://law.duke.edu/admis/fi nancial/handbook/sec1/ [https://perma.cc/4YCT-
LC5T]. See also Gregory Randolph, Price Discrimination and Rising Costs: Is There Any Relationship?, 
in DOING MORE WITH LESS: MAKING COLLEGES WORK BETTER 53, 60–62 (Joshua C. Hall ed., 
2010) (reviewing fi nancial information available to colleges when admitting students and 
calculating scholarships).
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schools to tailor individualized discount off ers for each student. If the initial 
discount misses the mark, the school may be able to negotiate directly with an 
applicant.101
In addition to possessing this information, each law school holds signifi cant 
market power over some of its applicants. Students do not have the option 
of purchasing a legal education from any law school; they are limited to the 
schools that off er them admission. As students choose among that subset of 
schools, they usually prefer one school over others .102 For each student, the 
preferred school holds considerable market power: Other schools are weak 
substitutes, and the student will pay more to attend the preferred school . 
In economic terms, each student’s demand for his/her preferred school is 
relatively inelastic; that inelasticity confers market power.103
Law schools, of course, vary in the extent of market power they exercise. 
Some schools have rivals that match them closely in student appeal; those 
schools may compete aggressively to attract students out of a common 
applicant pool. Other schools hold a more commanding position based on 
their geographic location, reputation, employment outcomes, or other factors. 
Every law school, however, holds market power over at least some applicants—
and the aggregate power is substantial.104
This combination of market power and consumer information gives law 
schools the ability to customize prices for admitted students. That price 
discrimination is lawful; indeed, it is an increasingly common practice in the 
101. Scholarship negotiations have become common in recent years. Although applicants, rather 
than schools, typically initiate these negotiations, schools often have the opportunity to 
increase off ers for desirable students.
  Prospective students possess some of the same information available to law schools; 
those insights can strengthen their hand in negotiations. Applicants, however, vary widely 
in their knowledge of the scholarship market. Even well-informed negotiators, moreover, 
cannot forestall price discrimination. The essence of price discrimination is that sellers 
customize prices to extract the maximum price that each applicant is willing to pay. 
Negotiation is simply one means of achieving that end.
102. That preference often rests on the school’s prestige or employment outcomes, which aff ect 
the market value of the degree. Geography also plays an important role for some applicants. 
Cf. Jerome M. Organ, Net Tuition Trends by LSAT Category from 2010-2014 with Thoughts on Variable 
Return on Investment, 67 J. LEGAL EDUC. 51, 52–54 (2017) (describing geographic diff erences in 
cost of law school). A range of other preferences can also sway an applicant’s decision.
103. A group of economists recently demonstrated a similar pattern of market power among 
colleges. See Dennis Epple et al., Market Power and Price Discrimination in the U.S. Market 
for Higher Education 27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res, Working Paper, No. 23360, 2017) (all 
colleges are able to obtain tuition revenue that exceeds marginal eff ective cost and “the 
most selective colleges have signifi cant market power and charge signifi cant mark-ups to 
students”), http://www.nber.org/papers/w23360.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6WD-ASUV].
104. Remember that market power does not guarantee a sale; consumer demand rarely is 
perfectly inelastic. By off ering a substantial scholarship, a second-choice school may lure an 
applicant away from his/her fi rst choice. The very size of the scholarships needed to achieve 
that goal, however, confi rms the market power that the fi rst-choice school wields.
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marketplace.105 Economists agree, however, that price discrimination almost 
always “transfer[s] wealth away from consumers and toward sellers. ”106 This 
happens because the seller can extract each buyer’s “reserve price,” the highest 
price at which the buyer is willing to purchase the service. The buyers who 
pay top dollar more than compensate for the ones who pay lower prices; on 
average, consumers pay more than they would in a uniform pricing scheme.
Price discrimination has two diff erent eff ects, which are important to 
separate. First, some consumers subsidize others. In legal education, as many 
educators have recognized, the students who pay list-price tuition subsidize 
those who receive scholarships. But second, and equally important, the average 
price rises for consumers. This second eff ect is not merely theoretical; several 
researchers have demonstrated its presence empirically in higher education .107 
One study calculated that a graduate program could raise net revenue by at 
least four percent to fi ve percent through price discrimination; larger gains of 
eight percent to nine percent would have been possible absent a statutory cap 
on tuition .108
This eff ect on overall price provides a procompetitive justifi cation for 
agreements to limit merit scholarships: By restricting price discrimination, 
those agreements would reduce tuition prices overall. Law school tuition is 
suffi  ciently high that even a marginal decrease would benefi t students.109 A 
105. See supra note 8 (noting the legality of price discrimination in service industries). For a 
discussion of increasing price discrimination in the marketplace, see Lina M. Khan, Note, 
Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 763 (2017) (discussing how retailers are anxious to 
use detailed consumer information to diff erentiate prices).
106. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS 
PRACTICE § 14.5a, at 772 (5th ed. 2016). See also Nicholas W. Hillman, Tuition Discounting for 
Revenue Management, 53 RES. IN HIGHER EDUC. 263, 268 (2012) (“colleges can intentionally 
exploit students’ willingness to pay in order to extract their consumer surplus”); Waldfogel, 
supra note 7, at 570 (“[P]rice discrimination can allow sellers to generate more revenue.”). 
107. See, e.g., Doti, supra note 7, at 365–66 (study of 107 colleges and universities suggested positive 
revenue eff ects of price discrimination, although gains appeared to diminish for less selective 
schools); Hillman, supra note 106 (study of public colleges demonstrated revenue-enhancing 
eff ect of price discrimination); Summers, supra note 98 (study of more than 100 private liberal 
arts colleges found that price discrimination increased revenue); Tiff any & Ankrom, supra 
note 7 (data from a sample of 233 colleges suggested that schools had increased net revenue 
through price discrimination). See generally Jerry Sheehan Davis, Unintended Consequences of 
Tuition Discounting, LUMINA FOUND. FOR EDUC. NEW AGENDA SERIES (Indianapolis, IN), May 
2003, at 4, https://www.luminafoundation.org/fi les/publications/Tuitiondiscounting.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MA2R-X9JB] (Tuition discounting “is the art and science of establishing 
the net price of attendance for students at amounts that will maximize tuition revenue while 
achieving certain enrollment goals.”); Dennis Epple et al., Admission, Tuition, and Financial 
Aid Policies in the Market for Higher Education, 74 ECONOMETRICA 885, 887 (2006) (by “link[ing] 
tuition to student (household) income,” colleges “extract additional revenues from students 
who are inframarginal consumers of [that] college”).
108. Waldfogel, supra note 7, at 595.
109. Suppose, for example, that a school’s average net tuition (with a high sticker price and 
discounting) is $25,000. If price discrimination generates a four percent premium, 
then eliminating discounts would lower tuition by an average of $1,000 per student for 
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price decline might also attract additional students to law school; most schools 
currently operate at signifi cantly less than full capacity .110
Schools, of course, might choose to maintain at least some price 
discrimination. A school, for example, might conclude that students with high 
LSAT scores add enough dynamism to the classroom that students with lower 
scores should subsidize the former students. Schools might also diff erentiate 
tuition so that students with corporate aspirations subsidize those committed 
to public service. No law prevents schools from making those choices. But if 
schools want to restrict merit-based scholarships, as many writers (including 
us) propose, the price-enhancing eff ects of those scholarships would help 
justify an agreement to limit them.
Need-based scholarships deserve special mention. Like merit-based 
scholarships, those discounts refl ect price discrimination. Students from 
wealthy backgrounds subsidize the tuition of classmates from low-income 
families; average prices may also rise. Three factors, however, make need-based 
scholarships more procompetitive than merit-based ones. First, law schools are 
unlikely to grant as many need-based awards as merit-driven ones.111 Any eff ect 
on overall prices, therefore, will be smaller than in the current system. Second, 
need-based scholarships will increase access to law school, which promotes 
consumer welfare.112 Need-based scholarships, fi nally, serve the procompetitive 
each year of enrollment. That $3,000 is equivalent to 2.5 weeks of pay at an entry-level 
law job. See Salaries for New Graduates Rise While Employment Rate Remains Unchanged, Number 
of Private Practice Jobs Tumbles, NALP (Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.nalp.org/uploads/
SelectedFindingsPressRelease_Classof2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/YN3M-G7CC] (median 
starting salary for 2015 graduates was $64,800).
110. Enrollment of fi rst-year J.D. students has fallen 29.3% over the past six years. Compare 
Enrollment and Degrees Awarded 1963-2012 Academic Years, AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. 
& ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/enrollment_degrees_awarded.
authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/N95G-2DHT] (52,488 fi rst-year J.D. students in 
2010-2011), with 2016 Standard 509 Information Report Data Overview, AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION 
OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/2016_
standard_509_data_overview.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/9S2T-XET2] (37,107 
fi rst-year J.D. students in 2016–2017).
111. In our current merit-focused system, two-thirds of all law students hold scholarships. See 
supra note 2. In contrast, about fi ve percent of students come from families in the bottom 
quartile of the income distribution; another eleven percent hail from families in the next 
quartile. Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENVER U.L. REV. 631, 639 
(2011). Even if need-based scholarships greatly increased attendance by those students, as we 
hope, the percentage attending will fall far short of two-thirds.
112. See infra Part II.B. Our current system of merit-based scholarships may attract some students 
who would otherwise have attended other graduate programs. There is little evidence, 
however, that this has occurred to any signifi cant extent. Applications to law school remain 
low, and schools are turning to other initiatives to attract those students. Allowing law school 
applicants to use scores from the general Graduate Record Exam (GRE), for example, may 
have a greater eff ect in attracting students from other degree programs. 
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goal of encouraging low-income students to expand their human capital.113 For 
all of these reasons, need-based scholarships have procompetitive eff ects that 
merit-based awards lack.
B.  Reduced Access and Diversity
In addition to raising overall costs, merit-based scholarships can 
signifi cantly reduce both access to higher education and diversity on campus. 
Those negative eff ects arise in at least four ways. First, if schools draw all 
scholarships from the same fi nancial bucket, increases in merit aid reduce the 
resources available for low-income students.114 This trade-off  is not inevitable; 
schools could fund need-based scholarships by taking money from other parts 
of the budget. As a practical matter, however, dollars for merit-based aid tend 
to diminish dollars for need-based scholarships.115 
Second, merit-based scholarships have driven up the list price of tuition. 
Those posted rates deter some applicants more than others: They cause more 
“sticker shock” among low-income or minority applicants than among their 
peers .116 Our high-list/high-discount system thus may discourage low-income 
and minority students from even considering law school .117
Third, the discounting system imposes particularly high psychic costs 
on low-income and minority applicants. Many of these applicants distrust 
bureaucratic decision-making .118 They may also fear that their race or low 
113. See infra Part II.C.
114. See SARA GOLDRICK-RAB, PAYING THE PRICE: COLLEGE COSTS, FINANCIAL AID, AND THE 
BETRAYAL OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 252 (2016).
115. See Davis, supra note 107, at 6-15; Griffi  th, supra note 66, at 1023.
116. See JENNIFER GIANCOLA & RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, TRUE MERIT: ENSURING OUR BRIGHTEST 
STUDENTS HAVE ACCESS TO OUR BEST COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 14-25 (2016), https://www.
luminafoundation.org/fi les/resources/jkcf-true-merit-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/48KX-
DAQA]; WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 13; Donald E. Heller, Student Price Response in Higher 
Education, 68 J. HIGHER EDUC. 624, 632, 647 (1997); Lesley J. Turner, Rethinking Institutional 
Aid: Implications for Aff ordability, Access, and the Eff ectiveness of Federal Student Aid, in REINVENTING 
FINANCIAL AID: CHARTING A NEW COURSE TO COLLEGE AFFORDABILITY 149, 150 (Andrew P. 
Kelly & Sara Goldrick-Rab eds., 2014).
117. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE GAO-10-20, HIGHER EDUCATION: ISSUES RELATED 
TO LAW SCHOOL COST AND ACCESS 37 (2009), http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/297206.pdf 
(noting that some law school offi  cials believed that “rising law school tuition may have 
disproportionately aff ected minority students”). Some law schools attempt to enhance 
diversity by off ering special scholarships to minority students; others try to increase access 
by considering need as part of their scholarship process. Unless schools advertise these 
practices widely, however, they will not overcome the disparate impact of sticker shock. 
See also infra notes 189-90 and accompanying text (describing the opacity of scholarship 
information currently provided by most law schools).
118. Sara Goldrick-Rab & Tammy Kolbe, A Matter of Trust: Applying Insights from Social Psychology to 
Make College Aff ordable, 3 POL’Y INSIGHTS FROM BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 237, 241 (2016).
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economic status will disadvantage them when negotiating for scholarships .119 
Law schools ask these students to commit to legal education, invest signifi cant 
time and money in studying for the LSAT, risk rejection from multiple schools, 
and then undertake an uncertain negotiation process—all before they will 
know the cost of their legal education. This is a heavy burden to place on any 
young adult, but it is particularly weighty for students with limited experience 
in higher education.120
Some of the same concerns may limit applications from another group 
that remains underrepresented in the legal profession: women.121 A large body 
of research demonstrates that women are less comfortable than men when 
negotiating for their own fi nancial advantage.122 By requiring prospective 
students to engage in high-stakes fi nancial negotiations before they attend 
their fi rst class, law schools may deter women from applying to their programs . 
Only 2.6% of female college graduates apply to law school, while 3.4% of male 
graduates do so.123
119. For studies demonstrating racial diff erences in negotiation outcomes, see Ian Ayres, Further 
Evidence of Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 109 
(1995); Paul J. Ferraro & Ronald G. Cummings, Cultural Diversity, Discrimination, and Economic 
Outcomes: An Experimental Analysis, 45 ECON. INQUIRY 217 (2007); Jennifer T. Kubota et al., The 
Price of Racial Bias: Intergroup Negotiations in the Ultimatum Game, 24 PSYCHOL. SCI. 2498 (2013). For 
the impact of socioeconomic class, see Michael W. Kraus & Wendy Berry Mendes, Sartorial 
Symbols of Social Class Elicit Class-Consistent Behavioral and Physiological Responses: A Dyadic Approach, 
143 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 2330 (2014).
120. See Randolph, supra note 100, at 67 (describing the burdens on students who “do not know 
the price that they will pay to attend a given college before they apply to schools”); Goldrick-
Rab & Kolbe, supra note 118 (describing the many psychic burdens that low-income and 
minority students bear as they pursue higher education).
  Applicants have tried to mitigate the uncertainty of law school pricing by developing 
websites like lawschoolnumbers.com and top-law-schools.com. Both sites encourage 
applicants to post information about their academic credentials, admission status at specifi c 
schools, and scholarship awards from those schools. Other applicants can draw upon this 
information when evaluating scholarship off ers and negotiating for a higher off er. The 
sites may assist some applicants, but they are probably unknown to others. For some, the 
information on these sites may actually increase the stress of the application and negotiation 
process. See also supra note 99 (describing how law schools may tap information contained in 
these sites).
121. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, A CURRENT GLANCE AT WOMEN 
IN THE LAW (2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/marketing/women/
current_glance_statistics_january2017.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/QLG5-
TBW8] (detailing persistent underrepresentation of women at diff erent levels of the 
profession).
122. See, e.g., LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON’T ASK: THE HIGH COST OF 
AVOIDING NEGOTIATION—AND POSITIVE STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE (2007); Emma Holliday 
et al., Gender Diff erences in Resources and Negotiation Among Highly Motivated Physician-Scientists, 30 J. 
GEN. INTERNAL MED. 401 (2015).
123. Deborah Jones Merritt & Kyle McEntee, The Leaky Pipeline for Women Entering 
the Legal Profession 1 (Nov. 2016), https://www.lstradio.com/women/documents/
MerrittAndMcEnteeResearchSummary_Nov-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/84B5-UNAF]. 
This statistic surprises many legal educators; they forget that women make up 57.1% of 
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The primary factor that law schools use to award “merit” scholarships, 
fi nally, correlates highly with race, gender, and socioeconomic background. 
Black and Latino/a law students have lower LSAT scores than their white 
and Asian classmates.124 Women suff er the same disadvantage compared with 
men.125 Students whose parents never attended college, similarly, average 
lower LSAT scores than students with more educated parents.126 Scholarships 
that stress LSAT scores, therefore, reduce access for all these historically 
disadvantaged groups.
 Whatever the mechanism, merit-based scholarships do seem to depress 
access and diversity within legal education. One study shows that the 
percentage of black and Mexican-American law students declined between 
1993 and 2008, a period in which schools increasingly embraced merit aid.127 
Another confi rms that that black, Latino/a, and moderate-income law students 
are less likely than their white, Asian, and affl  uent classmates to receive merit 
scholarships.128 And, although no study directly ties gender to scholarships, 
recent work shows that women law students cluster in signifi cantly lower-
ranked schools than men.129 That enrollment pattern may stem from schools 
off ering fewer merit scholarships to women.130
On the college level, a well-designed study off ers further evidence that 
merit-based aid diminishes access for minorities and low-income students. 
Economist Amanda Griffi  th compared colleges that shifted to merit aid with 
those that did not, while controlling for numerous diff erences between those 
college graduates. Id. If law school were as attractive to women as to men, applications 
would rise sixteen percent overall. Id. Note that women outnumber men in many other 
graduate programs; their reluctance to apply to law school does not refl ect a lack of interest 
in graduate education. Id.
124. See LSSSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 9.
125. LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, TECHNICAL REPORT 14-02, SUSAN P. DALESSANDRO ET 
AL., LSAT PERFORMANCE WITH REGIONAL, GENDER, AND RACIAL/ETHNIC BREAKDOWNS: 
2007–2008 THROUGH 2013-2014 TESTING YEARS 19–20 (2014), https://www.lsac.org/docs/
default-source/research-(lsac-resources)/tr-14-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AA6-RS8R].
126. LSSSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 10. Researchers frequently use parental education as a 
measure of family income. Id.
127. Conrad Johnson, Disturbing Trend in Law School Diversity, COLUM. L. SCH, http://blogs.law.
columbia.edu/salt/#content (last visited June 22, 2017). In more recent years, as overall 
class sizes have fallen, the percentage of black and Latino/a law students has risen again. 
See Aaron N. Taylor, Diversity as a Law School Survival Strategy, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 321, 340, 342 
(2015). The absolute number of those minority students, however, has declined and their 
enrollment has shifted to less prestigious schools. Id. at 340–43.
128. LSSSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 9–10. In this study, two-thirds of white (sixty-seven percent) 
and affl  uent (sixty-fi ve percent) students reported receiving merit scholarships; just half of 
black (forty-nine percent) and economically disadvantaged (fi fty-two percent) students did 
so.
129. Merritt & McEntee, supra note 123, at 2.
130. Id. at 3.
Agreements to Improve Student Aid: An Antitrust Perspective
38 Journal of Legal Education
groups .131 Her regression analysis persuasively shows that adoption of merit 
aid was “associated with a decrease in the percentage of low-income and Black 
students, particularly at the more selective institutions.”132
Conversely, another recent study shows that mandating need-based aid 
increases enrollment by low-income and minority students.133 The colleges 
in the latter study diff erentiated tuition by degree program but also devoted 
legislatively required amounts of revenue to need-based aid. The combined 
eff ect shifted low-income and minority students into degree programs with 
more promising career outcomes.
Law schools, in sum, have a strong argument that restrictions on merit-
based aid would increase both the number of students applying to law school 
and the diversity of those applicants. As the Third Circuit recognized in Brown 
II, those are important procompetitive eff ects. Enhancing consumer choice 
is a traditional procompetitive eff ect recognized by the antitrust laws.134 By 
restricting merit-based scholarships, law schools would attract more low-
income, minority, and female applicants—and would increase the number of 
students benefi ting from legal education.135 More diverse classes, meanwhile, 
would improve the quality of the educational product.136 Courts have also 
recognized that eff ect as procompetitive under rule-of-reason analysis.137 
These procompetitive eff ects carry special weight in legal education because 
law schools serve as gatekeepers to the legal profession. If law schools increase 
the number and diversity of their students, as well as the quality of their 
educational program, the profession will benefi t. Those competitive benefi ts, 
in turn, will fl ow to consumers of legal services.
131. Griffi  th, supra note 66. Griffi  th’s study included 133 private colleges that did not off er merit 
aid in 1987. Over the next nineteen years, ninety-three of those schools started awarding 
merit aid; Griffi  th compared outcomes at those schools with those at the other forty. 
132. Griffi  th, supra note 66, at 1033. See also Eric A. Hanushek et al., Borrowing Constraints, College 
Aid, and Intergenerational Mobility, 8 J. HUM. CAP. 1, 1 (2014) (in a theoretical model, need-based 
aid was more eff ective than merit-based aid in “promoting aggregate effi  ciency and income 
equality”); Sigal Alon, Who Benefi ts Most from Financial Aid? The Heterogeneous Eff ect of Need-Based 
Grants on Students’ College Persistence, 92 SOC. SCI. Q. 807 (2011) (demonstrating the importance 
of need-based aid in helping low-income students persist in college).
133. Rodney Andrews & Kevin Stange, Price Regulation, Price Discrimination, and Equality of Opportunity 
in Higher Education: Evidence from Texas (Univ of Mich., Working Paper, Feb. 2017), http://
www-personal.umich.edu/~kstange/papers/AndrewsStange2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/
PPC9-D3NG]).
134. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984); 
Brown II, 5 F.3d at 658, 675.
135. Most schools currently operate under capacity, see supra note 110, so they could admit 
qualifi ed low-income, minority, and female applicants without displacing other students.  
136. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 319–20, 330–32 (2003) (citing numerous sources).
137. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. at 114–15; Brown II, 5 F.3d at 674.
39
C.  Impaired Development of Human Capital
Law schools, like other educational programs, enhance human capital: A 
law degree increases both job opportunities and income for degree holders.138 
That capital development, however, is not uniform across law schools. Some 
schools are better investments than others .139
When prospective students choose among schools, therefore, they make 
an important choice about developing their human capital. Scholars have 
shown that wealthy students tend to choose institutions that will maximize 
their human capital, even if they pay more to attend those schools.140 Low- 
and middle-income students are more price-sensitive; they are more likely to 
compromise their capital development for lower tuition—even when long-term 
returns would justify a greater investment.141
Merit-based scholarships exacerbate this trend. Wealthy students enroll at 
the school that off ers them the highest promise of capital development, even if 
they pay full tuition for that opportunity.142 These students can aff ord to reject 
scholarship off ers from schools with lower prospects of capital development. 
Low- and moderate-income students, on the other hand, must balance 
capital development against cost. These students may decline full-price seats 
at schools that will maximize their capital development while accepting 
scholarships at schools that off er somewhat less promise. The latter students 
138. Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree, 43 J. LEGAL STUDIES 
249 (2014).
139. JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 49–50, 
57–60 (2005); Luis Garicano & Thomas N. Hubbard, Hierarchical Sorting and Learning Costs: 
Theory and Evidence from the Law, 58 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 349 (2005); Organ, supra 
note 102; Richard Sander & Jane Bambauer, The Secret of My Success: How Status, Eliteness, and 
School Performance Shape Legal Careers, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 893, 917 (2012) (status of 
law school correlates signifi cantly with income even after controlling for LSAT scores and 
law school grades); Scott F. Norberg, The Case for an ABA Accreditation Standard on Employment 
Outcomes 10 (FIU Legal Studs. Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 17-20, 2017), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2998306 (showing wide range of initial employment outcomes among law schools).
140. Christopher Avery & Caroline M. Hoxby, Do and Should Financial Aid Packages Aff ect Students’ 
College Choices? in COLLEGE CHOICES: THE ECONOMICS OF WHERE TO GO, WHEN TO GO, AND 
HOW TO PAY FOR IT 239, 265–68 (Caroline M. Hoxby ed., 2004).
141. See ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE & MARTIN VAN DER WERF, THE 20% SOLUTION: SELECTIVE 
COLLEGES CAN AFFORD TO ADMIT MORE PELL GRANT RECIPIENTS 6–7 (low-income students 
are underrepresented at selective colleges that “produce graduates that earn more in the 
workplace on average”), https://cew-7632.kxcdn.com/wp-content/uploads/The-20-Percent-
Solution-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WT4-PTMX]; ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE & JEFF STROHL, 
SEPARATE & UNEQUAL: HOW HIGHER EDUCATION REINFORCES THE INTERGENERATIONAL 
REPRODUCTION OF WHITE RACIAL PRIVILEGE (2013) (documenting increased segregation of 
black, Latino/a, and low-income students in less selective, low-tuition colleges), https://
cew-7632.kxcdn.com/wp-content/uploads/SeparateUnequal.FR_.pdf [https://perma.cc/
PPX8-9CY5]; Turner, supra note 116, at 161–62.
142. See Epple et al., supra note 103, at 1–2 (under merit-based schemes, students who pay 
maximum tuition at each school “are of relatively low ability in the school” and “have 
income suffi  ciently high so that they are willing to pay the price maximum”).
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benefi t from a low-cost legal education, but they constrain the long-term value 
of their degree.143
Merit-based aid thus fosters a system that sorts students by wealth, rather 
than by the merit it purports to reward.144 High-income students tend to 
“matriculate up,” paying full price to attend the school that is most attractive 
to them. Moderate-income students are more likely to “matriculate down,” 
accepting scholarships to attend less-preferred schools—even when they have 
better credentials than their wealthy peers .145
143. Choosing a lower-ranked school does not inevitably depress a student’s long-term 
prospects. A student who attends a lower-ranked school, for example, may compensate for 
that constraint by performing exceptionally well. See Sander & Bambauer, supra note 139, at 
901 (fi nding that student grades play a greater role than prestige in predicting the fi nancial 
returns to legal education). The strategy, however, is risky; some career opportunities decline 
precipitously outside the most elite law schools. The academic consensus, along with the 
behavior of wealthy students, counsels that “where you go to school matters.” GIANCOLA & 
KAHLENBERG, supra note 116, at 8.
144. See GIANCOLA & KAHLENBERG supra note 116, at 1 (“American postsecondary education is 
highly stratifi ed by socioeconomic class, with 72 percent of students in the nation’s most 
competitive institutions coming from families in the wealthiest quartile.”); Richard Sander, 
The Use of Socioeconomic Affi  rmative Action at the University of California, in THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION: NEW PATHS TO HIGHER EDUCATION DIVERSITY AFTER FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 99, 
105 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2014) (“Nationally, elite law schools . . . draw only about 
one-tenth of their students from the bottom half of the national SES distribution”); Aaron 
N. Taylor, Director’s Message, LSSSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 6 (“These trends [in law school 
merit aid] exacerbate preexisting privilege and disadvantage, setting the stage for long-term 
disparities in experiences and outcomes.”).
145. To understand this dynamic, consider two hypothetical students: Veronica is wealthy, while 
Betty is poor. Betty’s college grades and LSAT scores win her admission to Pembrooke 
School of Law, a fi ctitious school ranked about tenth in U.S. News. Betty’s credentials put her 
slightly above the median for Pembrooke, and that school off ers her a scholarship covering 
one-quarter of her tuition. Riverdale Law, another fi ctitious school ranked about thirtieth, 
also admits Betty. Her LSAT score and UGPA put her more signifi cantly above the median 
at Riverdale, so the school off ers her a half-tuition scholarship.
  Betty would like to attend Pembrooke because it has a higher ranking, it off ers a clinical 
program that appeals to her, and she particularly likes the professors she met during a 
campus visit. She concludes, however, that the price diff erential is too high; without a safety 
net of family support she is reluctant to borrow too heavily. She accepts the half-tuition 
scholarship from Riverdale.
  Veronica’s grades and scores are lower than Betty’s. When Betty gives up her seat at 
Pembrooke, Veronica is admitted off  the waitlist with no scholarship money. Several other 
schools, including Riverdale, off er Veronica small scholarships but she chooses to attend 
Pembrooke at full price; her parents’ wealth supports that option.
  How would a shift to need-based scholarships change this scenario? If Pembrooke 
devoted more of its resources to need-based scholarships, it might off er Betty a more 
substantial scholarship—allowing her to attend her preferred school. Veronica, then, would 
not gain admission to Pembrooke; she would attend Riverdale or another school that 
admitted her.
  The example demonstrates the paradox of “merit-based” aid. Under a merit-based 
system, the student with lower credentials (Veronica) attends the higher-ranked school. 
A shift to need-based aid allows the more qualifi ed student (Betty) to attend that higher-
ranked school if she wants to do so.
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Shifting aid to need-based scholarships alters this dynamic. Dennis Epple 
and his colleagues found that awarding college aid purely on the basis of need 
“causes some of the [fi nancially] poorer students to attend higher quality 
colleges” while “the reverse is true for some of the richer students.”146 A policy 
limiting merit-based aid thus “increases the access to high quality education 
of lower income households.”147 It can also raise the quality of students at each 
school because low-income students can aff ord to attend the most selective 
school that admits them.148
Enhancing the development of human capital improves consumer welfare 
in several ways. Well-educated individuals produce high-quality goods and 
services; they also innovate to challenge existing sellers. These highly educated 
individuals, fi nally, have the resources to consume a wide variety of goods 
and services. Our competitive economy prospers when individuals maximize 
development of their human capital.149 If law schools encourage low-income 
students to make the same educational investments that wealthier students are 
able to make, consumers and the economy will benefi t. Transferring resources 
from merit-based scholarships to need-based ones would help achieve that 
end. Wealthy students would still maximize their human capital investment 
by attending the institutions that best match their credentials and career goals. 
Financially disadvantaged students, meanwhile, would acquire the resources 
to make the same choices.150
III.  Practical Options for Law Schools and the Council
As explained above, our current system of merit-based aid undermines 
competition in at least three ways: It raises overall costs to law students, reduces 
access and diversity, and impairs capital development by low-income students. 
Those losses provide procompetitive justifi cations for agreements limiting 
merit-based scholarships. The justifi cations are especially compelling in the 
market for legal education because that market directly aff ects the one for legal 
services. If law schools can moderate costs, enhance access and diversity, and 
promote capital development, they will also improve competition in the legal 
profession.
146. Epple et al., supra note 107, at 916.
147. Id. at 888.
148. For an example of this eff ect, see the story of Betty and Veronica supra note 145.
149. See Goldin, supra note 10 (describing the importance of human capital development in the 
United States). Developing human capital is especially important in a global economy. 
Today’s law school graduates compete, not only with other graduates of U.S. schools, but 
with lawyers from around the world.
150. Some defenders of merit-based aid argue that these scholarships enable lower-ranked schools 
to enhance their educational quality by enrolling a few “superstars” who would otherwise 
attend a higher-ranked school. Low- and moderate-income superstars, however, are most 
likely to take advantage of those scholarships; wealthier superstars will choose to attend the 
higher-ranked school. Given the disadvantages that low-income students suff er throughout 
their lives, it seems unfair to rely upon them to enhance the education of wealthier (but less 
accomplished) classmates.
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These procompetitive eff ects off er strong policy reasons for law schools to 
limit merit-based aid; they would also provide a defense against any antitrust 
challenge. Under Brown II,151 O’Bannon,152 and other precedents, courts almost 
certainly would judge agreements to restrict merit aid under the rule of reason. 
A court might fi nd an agreement anti-competitive under the fi rst step of that 
analysis, but law schools could advance procompetitive justifi cations at least 
as strong as those presented in Brown II and O’Bannon.153 More narrowly tailored 
alternatives would be diffi  cult to identify; indeed, an agreement that merely 
limited merit aid (rather than banning it entirely) would be more narrowly 
tailored than the current congressional exemption.154 Rule-of-reason analysis 
thus would favor law schools .155
We recognize, however, that lawsuits are expensive and time-consuming to 
defend. Law schools might not want to risk those costs—although MIT won 
widespread admiration for doing so in the 1990s.156 We present here, therefore, 
three practical options for law schools. Each of these avenues would permit 
151. See supra notes 37–55 and accompanying text (discussing Brown II).
152. See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
153. The procompetitive rationales advanced in Brown were very similar to those off ered here. Law 
schools, however, are in a stronger position than the Brown defendants for two reasons: (1) 
A much broader theoretical and empirical literature supports their procompetitive claims; 
and (2) any agreement among law schools would not include the very dubious Ivy Overlap 
practice of agreeing on aid amounts for individual applicants.
  In O’Bannon, similarly, the defendant off ered weak empirical evidence of a procompetitive 
eff ect. See Ross & DeSarbo, supra note 88. Law schools can rely upon a well-developed 
literature to defend the procompetitive eff ects discussed here.
154. See supra Part II.C.
155. Judicial opinions suggest that “plaintiff s almost never win under the rule of reason.” Michael 
A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
827, 830 (2009). The most recent study of published opinions, in fact, found that plaintiff s 
won only one of 222 cases assessed under the rule of reason. Id. Disputes generating a 
published opinion may not represent the full universe of antitrust claims; defendants with 
weak cases may be more likely to settle before the dispute generates a judicial opinion. 
Still, the published case law suggests that current antitrust law favors defendants in many 
circumstances.
  Law schools faced with an antitrust claim might obtain summary dismissal of any 
private lawsuits, without reaching the rule-of-reason analysis, on the ground that no private 
plaintiff  can establish a suffi  cient antitrust injury. A law student with a high LSAT score and 
little fi nancial need might claim that an agreement restricting merit aid reduced the value of 
scholarships off ered to him. It would be diffi  cult, however, for that student to establish the 
value of any scholarship he would have received absent the agreement; current practices are 
highly discretionary and subject to individual negotiation. In addition, the challenger and 
other students would have benefi ted from an off setting moderation of list prices.
  Questions of antitrust standing and injury, however, are complex; a disgruntled student 
or other private party might suggest suffi  cient antitrust injury to proceed with a lawsuit. For 
that reason, we focus our discussion on outcomes under a full rule-of-reason analysis.
156. See WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 197 (“MIT’s stance was much admired by elite-college 
administrators, including many at Ivy colleges, and other people concerned about student 
aid. One of the smaller overlap colleges sent ten thousand dollars to MIT as a gesture of 
appreciation.”).
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schools to limit merit-based aid with little or no antitrust risk. In the fi nal 
subsection, we explain that most of the same options would support adoption 
of an accreditation standard limiting merit-based aid.
A.  Use the Statutory Safe Harbor
Congress already allows institutions of higher education to make agreements 
awarding scholarships only to fi nancially needy students; those covenants are 
exempt from the antitrust laws.157 Schools qualify for this exemption as long as 
they admit all students on a “need-blind basis.”158 Admissions, in other words, 
must occur “without regard to the fi nancial circumstances of the student 
involved or the student’s family.”159
We suspect that most, if not all, law schools admit students on a need-blind 
basis.160 The exemption, therefore, is available for any schools choosing to use 
it. The only drawback to this safe harbor is that it requires schools to award 
all their fi nancial aid on the basis of need.161 Many law schools might prefer to 
limit merit aid rather than ban it entirely. In particular, schools might want to 
retain scholarships focused on attracting minority students, those committed 
to public service, or those who have demonstrated exceptional leadership. 
Some endowed scholarships might also specify merit- rather than need-based 
criteria.
It is, however, at least worth considering this option. Preservation of merit-
based scholarships may not be as important as legal educators fi rst imagine. 
Schools could reward students committed to public service through back-
end loan repayment assistance programs rather than upfront scholarships.162 
Minority students often qualify for need-based aid, especially when schools 
consider family wealth rather than income.163 Schools, fi nally, may have 
adopted scholarships focused on leadership and other qualities partly to 
157. 15 U.S.C. § 1 note (2012). See generally supra Part II.C.
158. 15 U.S.C. § 1 note (2012).
159. Id.
160. For graduate programs, generous federal loans relieve much of the incentive to consider 
an applicant’s ability to pay. Law schools know that if an applicant cannot fi nance her 
education directly, she has the option of covering costs through federal loans.
161. See Collins & Cottafavi Memo, supra note 16, at 30.
162. Cf. Whitford, supra note 4, at 11 (favoring the use of more “back-ended needs-based fi nancial 
aid”).
163. See LSSSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 10 (“Black [law students] were the most likely recipients 
of need-based scholarship aid; white [students] were least likely.”). Harvard Law School, 
which awards all of its scholarships based on need, makes clear that it assesses several 
measures of a family’s wealth: “A resource assessment is a relative measure of a given family’s 
fi nancial strength compared to all other families applying for fi nancial aid in an academic 
year, and is best thought of as a measurement of each family’s ability to fi nance the cost of 
education over time. It is an evaluation of not just a family’s current resources from present 
income earned, but also of the overall savings and investment level, as well as the family’s 
ability to borrow against these resources.” Determination of Financial Need, supra note 12.
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balance awards tied to test scores and grades. If schools eliminate the latter 
scholarships, are other types of merit-based aid necessary? 
Need-based aid is so eff ective at lowering costs, increasing access, enhancing 
diversity, and developing human capital that law schools should at least 
explore agreements to abandon all merit-based aid. Those agreements would 
risk no antitrust liability. Note that the statutory exemption does not require 
all schools to participate in an agreement. A subset of schools could lead the 
way by agreeing to award fi nancial aid solely on the basis of need.164 Shifting 
scholarship practices as part of a group carries less rankings risk than acting 
unilaterally. Indeed, if schools publicize their shared commitment to lowering 
costs and addressing need, they might increase the quantity and quality of 
their applicants.165
B.  Lobby for Modification of the Statutory Exemption
If the current statutory exemption does not accommodate enough law 
schools, schools could ask Congress to modify the exemption. A slight change—
to allow agreements limiting merit-based aid—would serve the procompetitive 
interests outlined above. None of those interests requires complete abolition 
of merit aid; even limiting that aid could reduce costs, increase access, improve 
diversity, and enhance the development of human capital. Law schools, 
therefore, could make a persuasive policy case to modify the exemption.
In addition to those arguments, three factors might persuade Congress to 
grant this relief. First, the current statute simply refl ects the practices of the 
colleges that originally lobbied for the exemption. Those colleges wanted 
to ban all merit-based aid, and the statute adopted their goal. There is no 
evidence that Congress would have rejected a diff erent exemption that allowed 
agreements to limit merit aid.
Second, a modifi ed exemption would be less restrictive than the current 
one. The current provision off ers just two choices: Agree to ban all merit-based 
aid or make no agreements. Agreements to moderate merit aid off er more 
market fl exibility, better furthering both educational and competitive goals.
Finally, if law schools favor modifying the exemption, they are unlikely to 
meet opposition from other quarters.166 The change would impose no costs 
164. Shared characteristics might prompt schools to form this type of group. Schools with a 
commitment to Christian education, for example, might decide that need-based aid 
furthers that commitment. A group of fl agship public law schools, similarly, might further 
their identity by declaring their commitment to achieving lower costs, greater access, and 
increased diversity through need-based scholarships.
165. The current exemption expires on Sept. 30, 2022, but Congress has continually renewed a 
form of the exemption since fi rst adopting it in 1992. Even if the exemption ends in 2022, it 
gives law schools fi ve years to reform harmful scholarship practices.
166. Like Professor Whitford, we believe that “many law schools” would like to shift resources 
from merit-based aid to need-based aid, but that they don’t see a way to accomplish that goal 
without collective action. Whitford, supra note 4, at 12. Our article builds on that premise. 
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on the federal budget, and it would not compel any action by colleges or 
universities. Modifying the exemption would simply allow institutions to 
agree to limit merit-based aid if they believed those agreements would promote 
access and other higher education goals.
Several college presidents and policymakers have already expressed interest 
in lobbying Congress to modify the exemption.167 By working with those 
advocates, law schools would strengthen their position while minimizing 
their own investment in lobbying. Given the current statutory exemption, the 
strong policy reasons to modify that exemption, and the national interest in 
expanding fi nancial resources for needy students, this advocacy eff ort holds 
promise of success.
C.  Request a Letter from the Department of Justice
If law schools cannot fi t within the current antitrust exemption, and if 
Congress fails to respond to requests for a statutory modifi cation, schools have 
one other way to minimize antitrust risk while pursuing agreements to limit 
merit-based aid. A group of schools could design a suitable agreement and, 
before implementing the agreement, request a business review letter from the 
Department of Justice.
The department has a well-established procedure for advising businesses 
on the potential antitrust consequences of proposed conduct .168 Any business 
may submit a written request to the Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust 
Division, providing detailed information about the proposed practice. The 
division will review the proposed practice, requesting additional data and 
conducting an independent investigation if necessary. After completing the 
review, the department issues a letter off ering one of three possible responses:
1. The Department of Justice does not presently intend to bring an 
enforcement action against the proposed conduct.
2. The Department of Justice declines to state its enforcement intentions. 
The Division may or may not fi le suit if the proposed conduct happens.
3. The Department of Justice will sue if the proposed conduct happens.169
If schools prefer the current merit-based system, then Congress is unlikely to modify the 
exemption. But if educators genuinely want to elevate need-based aid over merit awards, 
it should be relatively easy to lobby Congress for a modifi cation of the current exemption.
167. See, e.g., WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 191-92; TIME TO REEXAMINE, supra note 16, at 10–11; 
Collins & Cottafavi Memo, supra note 16, at 30, 32.
168. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTRODUCTION TO ANTITRUST DIVISION BUSINESS REVIEWS (2011), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/fi les/atr/legacy/2011/11/03/276833.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6382-34WW]; Antitrust Division Business Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 
(2016). The Federal Trade Commission has a similar process, see Advisory Opinions, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/policy/advisory-opinions (last visited June 29, 2017) [https://
perma.cc/8PSY-FRCZ]. We focus on the Department of Justice process because that 
agency prosecuted the Ivy Overlap case.
169. U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, supra note 168, at 2.
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A positive response from the department (i.e., a “no present intention” 
letter) does not insulate the business from all antitrust liability. The Antitrust 
Division “remains free to bring whatever action it subsequently comes 
to believe is required by the public interest.”170 After issuing a “no present 
intention” letter, however, the division “has never subsequently brought a 
criminal action” as long as the parties made “full disclosure at the time the 
business review request was presented to the Division.”171
The division also publicizes its business review letters;172 the content of those 
letters may discourage private plaintiff s from challenging the reviewed action. 
If litigation occurs, “courts frequently cite [the division’s] review as a factor in 
judicial approval of [the] arrangements.”173 Indeed, “there is no reported case 
in which an approved agreement was subsequently held to be unlawful. ”174 A 
positive business review letter, therefore, would give law schools substantial 
protection against antitrust liability.175
Antitrust experts warn of some drawbacks to seeking a business review letter. 
Division staff  may be conservative in issuing positive letters; if an arrangement 
is novel, the division may conduct a “prolonged” review culminating in 
a noncommittal letter.176 More worrisome, seeking a review letter may alert 
the division and private plaintiff s to activity that would have otherwise gone 
unnoticed.177 
These reservations, however, are unlikely to apply to law schools proposing 
to regulate merit-based scholarships. Law schools are nationally prominent; 
they would not be able to hide an agreement from the Antitrust Division or 
other potential plaintiff s. The issues surrounding limitation of merit-based aid, 
furthermore, were extensively explored in the Brown litigation and enactment 
of the congressional exemption. Assessing the procompetitive (or anti-
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See Business Reviews, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (last updated Mar. 25, 2016), https://www.justice.
gov/atr/business-reviews 
173. Peter C. Carstensen, Replacing Antitrust Exemptions for Transportation Industries: The Potential for a 
“Robust Business Review Clearance,” 89 OR. L. REV. 1059, 1069 (2011).
174. Id. See also Ky P. Ewing, Jr., Thoughts on Seeking Business Reviews of Competitor Collaborations, 
ANTITRUST, Summer 2005, at 40, 42 (“to the best of my knowledge, no successful antitrust 
challenge has ever been mounted in court by a private plaintiff  against activities ‘cleared’ by 
[the Antitrust Division]”).
175. A positive letter, unfortunately, cannot insulate schools from the risk that a lawsuit would 
be fi led. Plaintiff s fi le many unsuccessful antitrust challenges, see supra note 155, and those 
lawsuits must be defended. Some plaintiff s, however, would have trouble establishing 
standing to challenge an agreement to restrict merit scholarships; others would struggle 
to prove their damages. See supra note 155. Those factors, when combined with a positive 
business review letter, might dissuade plaintiff s and attorneys from fi ling suit.
176. Ewing, supra note 174, at 42.
177. Id. at 41.
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competitive) eff ects of such an agreement should not be unduly challenging 
for Antitrust Division attorneys. Law schools could hope for a defi nitive letter 
rather than a noncommittal one.178
Most important, the procompetitive arguments outlined above make a 
persuasive case in favor of agreements limiting merit-based scholarships. Even 
with limited empirical evidence, the Third Circuit signaled in Brown II that 
similar rationales could justify these agreements under the rule of reason. 
Over the past twenty-fi ve years, economists and other social scientists have 
built a substantial body of research supporting that conclusion. That research 
could help convince the Antitrust Division that voluntary agreements limiting 
merit aid are procompetitive.
D.  Adopt an Accreditation Standard
For simplicity, our discussion has focused on the antitrust status of 
agreements among individual law schools. The Council of the ABA Section of 
Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, however, could also limit merit-
based scholarships by adopting an accreditation standard. Such a standard 
could bar merit-based aid entirely, limit the extent of that aid, restrict the 
sources of that aid, or take other forms.
An accreditation standard could establish a uniform guidepost for all 
law schools while leaving signifi cant fl exibility to each school. A standard 
requiring that need-based aid at least equal merit-based aid, for example, 
would not require law schools to award particular levels of aid—or any aid at 
all. Nor would that type of standard dictate the type of “merit” recognized 
by law schools, the particular students receiving aid, or the amounts of those 
awards. Law schools would make all of the latter decisions unilaterally.
From an antitrust perspective, an accreditation standard would not benefi t 
from the current statutory exemption; that exemption protects agreements 
among schools, not accreditation standards. The council, however, could 
lobby Congress to modify the exemption to allow accreditation standards 
limiting merit-based scholarships. That advocacy could incorporate the same 
arguments outlined above.179 Similarly, the council could seek a business 
review letter focused on the legality of an accreditation standard. Once again, 
the policy arguments developed in this article would support a positive letter.
178. A consortium of colleges and universities used the business-review process in 2011 to seek the 
Department’s perspective on a “Designated Suppliers Program” governing school-licensed 
apparel. Letter from Donald I. Baker, Baker & Miller, PLLC, to Acting Assistant Attorney 
Gen. Sharis A. Pozen (Dec. 15, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/fi les/atr/
legacy/2014/01/15/302113.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9UK-BVPM]. The proposed program 
included regulation of minimum wages and other working conditions for companies 
participating in the program, but the Department found countervailing procompetitive 
benefi ts and issued a “no present intention” letter. Letter from Acting Assistant Attorney 
Gen. Sharis A. Pozen to Donald I. Baker, Baker & Miller PLLC (Dec. 16, 2011), https://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/fi les/atr/legacy/2011/12/19/278342.pdf [https://perma.cc/
PY7C-GT8X].
179. See supra Part II.
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It is possible that Congress and the Department of Justice would view an 
accreditation standard even more favorably than an agreement among law 
schools. When applying antitrust law, courts have been quite deferential to 
accreditation standards .180 That acquiescence is especially appropriate when 
(a) the accrediting body includes decision-makers drawn from outside the 
regulated group, and (b) any proposed standards are subject to public notice 
and comment. These conditions limit the power of competitors to manipulate 
accreditation standards in anti-competitive ways.181
The council’s composition and procedures satisfy both of those 
requirements,182 which would carry weight in any antitrust challenge. If the 
council concluded after both internal deliberation and public notice and 
comment that educational and procompetitive goals require channeling more 
fi nancial resources to need-based scholarships, and that modest limits on merit 
aid would further that end, it is diffi  cult to imagine the Department of Justice 
or courts second-guessing that decision.183
180. See, e.g., Found. for Interior Design Educ. Research v. Savannah Coll. of Art & Design, 244 
F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2001); Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. ABA, 107 F.3d 1026, 1038 
(3d Cir.1997); see generally AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, HANDBOOK ON THE 
ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF STANDARDS SETTING (2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter STANDARDS SETTING]; 
Clark C. Havighurst & Peter M. Brody, Accrediting and the Sherman Act, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Autumn 1994, at 199 (1995) (reviewing history and theory of accreditation cases); 
Matthew Struhar, How to Dismantle a Virtual Cartel: The Promises and Pitfalls of Higher Education 
Reform in California, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 127, 138 (2013) (“courts have not found that the 
Sherman Act requires aggressive policing of accreditation”).
181. Cf. STANDARDS SETTING, supra note 180, at 55 (“the DOJ has indicated that it is less inclined to 
challenge a proposed standard where a wide array of constituencies was involved in setting 
the standard”).
182. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N ,THE LAW SCHOOL 
ACCREDITATION PROCESS 3 (2016) (“The Council is comprised of 21 voting members, no 
more than 10 of whom may be law school deans or faculty members. Other members of 
the Council include judges, practicing attorneys, one law student, and at least three public 
members.”), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_
education/2016_accreditation_brochure_fi nal.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/
M2PC-RZVB]; SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA 
STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, 2016–2017, at 125–26 
(2016) (outlining internal operating practices for review and revision of standards).
183.  The council, however, would not be able to invoke state-action immunity to shield the type 
of standards discussed here. Although several states require bar applicants to graduate from 
ABA-accredited law schools, and thus delegate some authority over professional preparation 
to the ABA Council, the council is not itself sovereign. To invoke state-action immunity, 
therefore, the council would have to satisfy the two-part test recently confi rmed in N.C. State 
Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015). Both prongs of that test would be diffi  cult 
for the council to satisfy. State supreme courts have not “articulated a clear policy” favoring 
agreements to limit merit-based aid; nor do they off er “active supervision” when the council 
develops accreditation standards. Id. at 1112.
  State-action immunity plays a more central role when unaccredited law schools (or their 
students) challenge an accreditation standard. Courts have concluded that those plaintiff s 
cannot blame accreditation standards for the fact that graduates of unaccredited schools are 
not allowed to practice law in some states. Those “complaints are more properly directed to 
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It is true that the department sued the ABA in 1995, challenging several 
accreditation standards as unlawful restraints of trade.184 That action, however, 
concentrated on practices that tended to enhance faculty salaries, as well 
as on procedural defects in the council’s membership and standard-setting 
procedures. “The focus of th[e] case,” the department explained, “was the 
capture of the ABA’s law school accreditation process by those who used it 
to advance their self-interest . . . .”185 The department acknowledged that it 
was “not particularly qualifi ed” to determine the content of most accreditation 
rules.186 Instead, it sought “to reform the process, removing the opportunity 
for taint, and then to have the cleansed process establish new rules.”187
The accreditation standards proposed in this article would not fi nancially 
benefi t law schools at students’ expense. On the contrary, one purpose—
and likely eff ect—of any limit on merit-based aid would be to lower average 
tuition paid by students.188 Given that goal, the companion aims of increasing 
access and diversity, and the council’s current processes, it is unlikely that the 
department would challenge an accreditation standard focused on increasing 
resources for need-based aid.
At the very least, the ABA Council could adopt an accreditation standard 
requiring law schools to publicize scholarship practices on their websites and 
in other admissions materials. The ABA gathers annual information about the 
percentage of students receiving scholarships at each school, the percentage 
receiving diff erent levels of aid, and the quartile value of those scholarships. 
Those data appear in the “ABA Standard 509 Information Report,” which 
most law schools post on their websites .189 The law school web pages we have 
visited, however, give students no clue that information about tuition discounts 
is buried in those linked reports. Instead, schools use extraordinarily vague 
language to describe their scholarship practices .190
the state supreme courts that have chosen to recognize only ABA-accredited schools” and 
those “state regulatory policies are outside the ambit of the Sherman Act.” Zavaletta v. ABA, 
721 F. Supp. 96, 98 (E.D. Va. 1989).
184. Complaint, United States v. ABA, No. 1:95CV01211 (June 27, 1995), https://www.justice.
gov/atr/case-document/fi le/485696/download [https://perma.cc/8V7Y-SRZL].
185. United States’ Response to Public Comments at 4, United States v. ABA, No. 1:95CV01211 
(Oct. 27, 1995) https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/fi le/485676/download [https://
perma.cc/PF9P-SLHQ].
186. Id.
187. Id. See also Order and Final Judgment, United States v. ABA, No. 1:95CV01211 (June 25, 
1996) (focusing on salary concerns and procedural remedies), https://www.justice.gov/atr/
case-document/fi le/485671/download [https://perma.cc/7LC7-BSEW].
188. See supra Part II.A. 
189. These reports also appear on the ABA’s website, ABA REQUIRED DISCLOSURES, supra note 1.
190. Our alma mater, for example, includes this language in the fi nancial aid portion of its website: 
“Columbia Law School awards grant assistance primarily on the basis of demonstrated 
fi nancial need. However, there are a number of fellowships that are not based on fi nancial 
need, which are awarded by the Admissions Offi  ce at the time an applicant is admitted 
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A “scholarship transparency” standard would require schools to disclose 
prominently, in language that applicants will understand: (a) the criteria they 
use to award scholarships; (b) the approximate number and size of awards 
conferred in diff erent categories; and (c) whether the school will negotiate 
off ers. Students considering law school should be able to estimate the tuition 
they will pay before they invest signifi cant time and money in the application 
process. Potential applicants should also have the information they need 
to negotiate eff ectively. The opacity of our current system hurts too many 
applicants—especially those from historically disadvantaged groups.
Law schools might object that they need fl exibility in crafting each year’s 
scholarship off ers, so they could not reliably publicize the number and amount 
of grants in advance. This, however, would simply indicate that schools use 
discounts to maximize their own revenue and prestige rather than to recognize 
genuine merit or address fi nancial need. Students—especially low-income, 
minority, and female students—would benefi t from open information about 
the discounts each school might be willing to off er them.
Conclusion
Many legal educators are pessimistic about the chances of reforming 
fi nancial aid practices. We are somewhat more optimistic: We see several 
options for law schools or the council to limit merit-based aid and devote 
more resources to need-based scholarships. That shift could moderate the 
costs of legal education; increase access for low-income, minority, and female 
students; enhance diversity; and encourage sounder investment in human 
capital. These benefi ts would accrue to individual applicants, law schools, the 
legal profession, and the economy as a whole. The potential benefi ts are great, 
while the risks are low.
The antitrust laws, as we have shown, do not forbid all agreements or 
accreditation standards designed to limit merit-based aid. On the contrary, 
law schools and the council have several promising avenues to pursue. The 
avenues require some eff ort, and one of them is not entirely risk-free. The 
question is: Will law schools put in the eff ort? How strong is their commitment 
to increasing access and diversity in our profession? If the will exists, the ways 
are there.
to the Law School. There is no separate application for these fellowships.” Financial Aid: 
An Introduction, COLUM. L. SCH., http://www.law.columbia.edu/fi nancial-aid/introduction 
(last visited June 30, 2017) [https://perma.cc/AQP6-SNX4]. We could not fi nd any further 
description of the number, amount, or criteria for the non-need-based fellowships, although 
we perused all of the fi nancial aid pages and searched the site for “fellowships.”
  A few law schools do give students a candid view of their scholarship practices. See, e.g., 
JD  Scholarships, T. JEFFERSON SCH. L., https://www.tjsl.edu/admissions/scholarships (last 
visited July 9, 2017) [https://perma.cc/7W5M-NCVX ](LSAT and UGPA matrix used to 
calculate scholarships); Scholarships and Financial Aid, W. MICH. U. COOLEY SCH. L., http://
cooley.edu/prospective/scholarships.html (last visited July 9, 2017) [https://perma.cc/4V54-
APAS] (slightly less detailed matrix).
